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A version of quantum theory that is universal (applies to all
physical systems), and deterministic (no random numbers), was
ﬁrst proposed informally by Schrödinger (Bitbol, 1996) and then
independently and in detail by Everett (DeWitt & Graham, 1973).
Subsequent work to elaborate and reﬁne it has resulted in what is
often called Everettian quantum theory (Wallace, 2012). It exists in
several variants, but I shall use the term to refer only to those that
are universal and deterministic in the above senses. All of them
agree with Everett's original theory that generically, when an
experiment is observed to have a particular result, all the other
possible results also occur and are observed simultaneously by
other instances of the same observer who exist in physical reality
– whose multiplicity the various Everettian theories refer to by
terms such as ‘multiverse’, ‘many universes’, ‘many histories’ or
even ‘many minds’.1
Speciﬁcally, suppose that a quantum system S has been pre-
pared in a way which, according to a proposed law of motion L,
will have placed it in a state ψ
 . An observable X^ of S is then
perfectly measured by an observer A (where A includes anLtd. This is an open access article
ral versions. The original one
does not count as Everettian
es minds not being physical
therefore arguably not uni-
efects and is Everettian, so itsappropriate measuring apparatus and as much of the rest of the
world as is affected). That means that the combined system S  A
undergoes a process of the form
ψ
  0j i-
X
i
xih jψ i xi; aij i; ð1Þ
where 0j i denotes the initial state of A, the xij i are the eigenstates2
of X^, and each aij i is a þ1-eigenstate of the projector for A's having
observed the eigenvalue xi of X^. For generic ψ
 , all the coefﬁcients
xih jψ i in (1) are non-zero, and therefore all the possible mea-
surement results a1; a2;… happen, according to L and Everettian
quantum theory. Moreover, since interactions with the environ-
ment can never be perfectly eliminated, the measurement must be
imperfect in practice, so we can drop the qualiﬁcation ‘generic’: in
all measurements, every possible result happens simultaneously.
Furthermore, the theory is deterministic: it says that the evo-
lution of all quantities in nature is governed by differential equa-
tions (e.g. the Schrödinger or Heisenberg equations of motion)
involving only those quantities and space and time, and thus it
does not permit physically random processes. This is in contrast
with certain other versions of quantum theory, and notably ‘wave-
function-collapse’ variants in which measurements (and effec-
tively only they) are governed by special, stochastic laws of motion
whose effects are summarised in the Born rule. For perfectunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
2 Here and throughout, I am treating the measured observables as having
discrete eigenvalues. The notation would be more cumbersome, but the arguments
of this paper no different, for continuous eigenvalues.
3 By acknowledging Popper’s priority I am neither claiming that the account of
scientiﬁc methodology that I shall present here is entailed by Popper’s philosophy
of science nor, on the other hand, that it departs signiﬁcantly from it. Still less am I
claiming that Popper himself would have agreed with its application to quantum
theory – indeed, he rejected Everettian quantum theory (or at least, the versions
known at the time). Here I only wish to show how my account solves the problem
stated in Section 1 and illuminates several other matters.
4 In this paper I am concerned with fundamental theories, but in fact any
theory, to be testable, must at least explain why a particular experiment would
constitute a test, because it must explain which variables would be confounding
factors and which wouldn’t. So strictly explanationless predictions cannot exist.
(See Deutsch (2011, (Chap. 1)) and the discussion of predictive oracles in Deutsch
(1997).)
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If a system is initially in a state ψ
 ; and one of its observables
X^ is measured; so that the state of the systemþobserver at the
time t immediately before completion of the measurement is
Ψ tð Þ
 ¼
X
i
xih jψ〉 xi; aij i; then immediately after time t that state
changes ‘collapses’ð Þ randomly to one ofthe xi; aij i meaning thatð
the eigenvalue xi of X^ is observed

with probability xih jψ
 j2:
ð2Þ
In contrast, according to Everettian quantum theory, nothing
singles out one of the ai from the others: they all happen; every
possible result is experienced, and at times greater than t the state
of the combined system continues to evolve smoothly and uni-
tarily from Ψ tð Þ
 . What, then, can the predictive content of the
theory, and consequently of laws of motion that conform to it such
as L above, possibly be? That is the central problem addressed in
this paper.
In particular, although the coefﬁcients xih jψ i are different for
the different instances of the observer, nothing about their values
(except for which of them are exactly zero, which in practice none
of them ever are) describes any experience of the observer at the
time t. Only the ai do. Hence it has been argued (e.g. by Kent
(2010)) that under Everettian quantum theory the coefﬁcients
xih jψ i are purely ‘decorative’ – i.e. predictively irrelevant – making
it what I shall call a mere everything-possible-happens theory. That
is to say, the only thing it asserts about the reality described by (1)
is that all the values x1; x2;…, each with its corresponding result
a1; a2;…, including its effects on the observer, are simultaneously
realised physically. Thus it would be a multi-universe theory that
predicts nothing about the results of experiments except that
(each instance of) the observer will experience some result among
the a1; a2;… – i.e. among all results that are possible according to
L. The same predictions about the results of experiments are made
by the corresponding something-possible-happens theory – namely
a single-universe theory saying that exactly one of the pairs xi; aið Þ
describes what will happen in reality (and therefore that exactly
one of the ai will be experienced), but saying nothing about
which one.
Kent concludes on the basis of this supposed predictive
equivalence with an associated everything-possible-happens the-
ory, that Everettian quantum theory is untestable. And that
therefore attempted single-universe versions of quantum theory
(such as ‘collapse’ theories and ‘pilot-wave’ theories), whatever
their weaknesses in other respects, are preferable, since they, at
least in some “domain of validity”, predict the probabilities of the
possible results.
In fact, as I shall argue (Section 3), everything-possible-
happens theories are not inherently untestable; and in any case,
Everettian quantum theory is not one of them (Section 8). This will
involve correcting some widespread misconceptions about prob-
ability and about the logic of experimental testing in general,
which I shall do in Sections 2–4, where I shall present a version of
scientiﬁc methodology that makes no use of probability, credences
or theory conﬁrmation. Then, in Section 5, I shall discuss the status
of stochastic theories, and in Section 6, how the theory of
experimental errors can be framed in that non-probabilistic
methodology. And in Sections 7 and 8 I shall discuss testability
in collapse-endowed theories and Everettian quantum theory
respectively.2. Explanations of explicanda
Prevailing discussions (e.g. Dawid & Thébault, 2014; Greaves &
Myrvold, 2010) of the testability of various versions of quantum
theory have approached the matter indirectly, in terms of support
or conﬁrmation – asking how our credence (degree of belief) for a
theory should be changed by experiencing results of experiments.
However, experimental conﬁrmation is a philosophically con-
tentious concept. Notably, it is rejected root and branch by Popper
(1959). I shall present an account of the nature and methodology
of scientiﬁc testing that closely follows Popper's. It differs from his,
if at all,3 by regarding fundamental science as exclusively expla-
natory. That is to say, I take a scientiﬁc theory to be a conjectured
explanation4 (explanatory theory) of some aspects of the physical
world – the explicanda of the theory – that is testable (I shall
elaborate what that means below) by observation and experiment.
A scientiﬁc explanation is a statement of what is there in reality,
and how it behaves and how that accounts for the explicanda.
Neither conﬁrmation nor credence nor ‘inductive reasoning’ (from
observations to theories or to justiﬁcations of theories as true or
probable) appear in this account. So in this view the problem
described in Section 1 is about testing theories.
This contradicts the ‘Bayesian’ philosophy that rational cre-
dences obey the probability calculus and that science is a process
of ﬁnding theories with high rational credences, given the obser-
vations. It also contradicts, for instance, instrumentalism and
positivism, which identify a scientiﬁc theory with its predictions of
the results of experiments, not with its explanations. My argument
here, that Everettian quantum theory is testable, depends on
regarding it as an explanatory theory, and on adopting an
improved notion of experimental testing that takes account of
that.
Scientiﬁc methodology, in this conception, is not about any-
one's beliefs or disbeliefs. Rather, it assumes that someone has
conjectured explanatory theories (though it says nothing about
how to do that), and it requires those who know (i.e. are aware of)
those theories and want to improve them, to attempt to locate
speciﬁc ﬂaws and deﬁciencies and to attempt to correct those by
conjecturing new theories or modiﬁcations to existing theories.
Explicanda in the sciences usually involve appearances of some
sort (e.g. the perceived blueness of the sky). Theoretical matters
can also be explicanda (e.g. that classical gravity and electrostatics
both have an inverse-square force law), but those will not concern
us here. Explanations of appearances typically account for them in
terms of an unperceived, underlying reality (e.g. differential scat-
tering of photons of different energies) that brings about those
appearances (though not only them).
In this paper I shall be concerned with the part of scientiﬁc
methodology that deals with experimental testing. But note that
experimental testing is not the primary method of ﬁnding fault
with theories. The overwhelming majority of theories, or mod-
iﬁcations to theories, that are consistent with existing evidence,
are never tested by experiment: they are rejected as bad
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explanation too: they are precisely attempts to locate ﬂaws in a
theory by creating new explicanda of which the theory may turn
out to be a bad explanation.
Let me distinguish here between a bad explanation and a false
one. Which of a theory's assertions about an explicandum are false
and which are true (i.e. correspond with the physical facts) is an
objective and unchanging property of the theory (to the extent
that it is unambiguous). But how bad or good an explanation is
depends on how it engages with its explicanda and with other
knowledge that happens to exist at the time, such as other
explanations and recorded results of past experiments. An expla-
nation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by
other good explanations,5 but we shall not need precise criteria
here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad
(or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…
(i) it seems not to account for its explicanda; or
(ii) it seems to conﬂict with explanations that are otherwise
good; or
(iii) it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it
explains nothing).
It follows that sometimes a good explanation may be less true
than a bad one (i.e. its true assertions about reality may be subset
of the latter's, and its false ones a superset). Since two theories
may have overlapping explicanda, or be ﬂawed in different
respects, the relations ‘truer’ and ‘better’ are both only partial
orderings of explanations. Nevertheless, the methodology of sci-
ence is to seek out, and apparently to correct, apparent ﬂaws,
conﬂicts or deﬁciencies in our explanations (thus obtaining better
explanations), in the hope that this will correct real ﬂaws and
deﬁciencies (thus providing truer explanations).
When we, via arguments or experiments, ﬁnd an apparent
ﬂaw, conﬂict or inadequacy in our theories, that constitutes a
scientiﬁc problem and the theories are problematic (but not
necessarily refuted yet – see below). So scientiﬁc methodology
consists of locating and then solving problems; but it does not
prescribe how to do either. Both involve creative conjectures –
ideas not prescribed by scientiﬁc methodology. Most conjectures
are themselves errors, and there need not be a right error to
make next. Accordingly, all decisions to modify or reject theories
are tentative: they may be reversed by further argument or
experimental results. And no such event as ‘accepting’ a theory,
distinct from conjecturing it in the ﬁrst place, ever happens (cf.
Miller, 2006, (Chap. 4)).
Scientiﬁc methodology, in turn, does not (nor could it validly)
provide criteria for accepting a theory. Conjecture, and the cor-
rection of apparent errors and deﬁciencies, are the only processes
at work. And just as the objective of science isn't to ﬁnd evidence
that justiﬁes theories as true or probable, so the objective of the
methodology of science isn't to ﬁnd rules which, if followed, are
guaranteed, or likely, to identify true theories as true. There can be
no such rules. A methodology is itself merely a (philosophical)
theory – a convention, as Popper (1959) put it, actual or proposed
– that has been conjectured to solve philosophical problems, and
is subject to criticism for how well or badly it seems to do that.6
There cannot be an argument that certiﬁes it as true or probable,
any more than there can for scientiﬁc theories.
In this view a scientiﬁc theory is refuted if it is not a good
explanation but has a rival that is a good explanation with the5 For an informal discussion of good explanation, see Deutsch (2011, (Chap. 1)).
6 For example, Popper’s theory was proposed in order to avoid the problem of
induction, and the problem of inﬁnite regress in seeking authority (‘justiﬁcation’)
for theories, among other problems.same (or more) explicanda. So another consequence is that in the
absence of a good rival explanation, an explanatory theory cannot
be refuted by experiment: at most it can be made problematic. If
only one good explanation is known, and an experimental result
makes it problematic, that can motivate a research programme to
replace it (or to replace some other theory). But so can a theore-
tical problem, a philosophical problem, a hunch, a wish – anything.
An important consequence of this explanatory conception of
science is that experimental results consistent with a theory T do
not constitute support for T. That is because they are merely
explicanda. A new explicandum may make a theory more pro-
blematic, but it can never solve existing problems involving
a theory (except by making rival theories problematic – see
Section 3). The asymmetry between refutation (tentative) and
support (non-existent) in scientiﬁc methodology is better under-
stood in this way, by regarding theories as explanations, than
through Popper's (op. cit.) own argument from the logic of pre-
dictions, appealing to what has been called the ‘arrow of modus
ponens’. Scientiﬁc theories are only approximately modelled as
propositions, but they are precisely explanations.
I now deﬁne an objective notion, not referring to probabilities
or ‘expectation values’, of what it means for a proposed experi-
ment to be expected to have a result x under an explanatory theory
T. It means that if the experiment were performed and did not
result in x, T would become (more) problematic. Expectation is
thus deﬁned in terms of problems, and problems in terms of
explanation, of which we shall need only the properties (i)–(iii).
Note that expectations in this sense apply only to (some) physical
events, not to the truth or falsity of propositions in general – and
particularly not to scientiﬁc theories: if we have any expectation
about those, it should be that even our best and most fundamental
theories are false. For instance, since quantum theory and general
relativity are inconsistent with each other, we know that at least
one of them is false, presumably both, and since they are required
to be testable explanations, one or both must be inadequate for
some phenomena. Yet since there is currently no single rival
theory with a good explanation for all the explicanda of either of
them, we rightly expect their predictions to be borne out in any
currently proposed experiment.
A test of a theory is an experiment whose result could make the
theory problematic. A crucial test – the centrepiece of scientiﬁc
experimentation – can, on this view, take place only when there
are at least two good explanations of the same explicandum (good,
that is, apart from the fact of each other's existence). Ideally it is an
experiment such that every possible result will make all but one of
those theories problematic, in which case the others will have
been (tentatively) refuted.
It will sufﬁce to conﬁne attention to problems arising from tests
of fundamental theories in physics. And of those problems, only
the simplest will concern us, namely when an existing explanation
apparently does not account for experimental results. This can
happen when there seems either to be an unexplained regularity in
the results (criterion (i) above), or an irregularity (i.e. an explana-
tion's prediction not being borne out – criterion (ii) above). So, if
the result of an experiment is predicted to be invariably a1, but in
successive trials it is actually a5; a29;a1; a3…, with no apparent
pattern, that is an apparent irregularity. If it is a5; a5;a5; a5…, that is
apparently both an apparent unexplained regularity and an irre-
gularity. Scientiﬁc methodology in this conception does not spe-
cify how many instances constitute a regularity, nor what con-
stitutes a pattern, nor how large a discrepancy constitutes a pre-
diction apparently not being borne out (as distinct from being a
mere experimental error – see Section 6). Sometimes conﬂicting
opinions about these matters can be resolved by repeating the
experiment, or by testing other assumptions about the apparatus,
etc. But in any case, the existence of a problem with a theory has
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unless both the new and the old explicanda are well explained by a
rival theory. In that case the problem becomes grounds for con-
sidering the problematic theory tentatively refuted. Therefore, to
meet criterion (iii) above, it must not be protected from such a
refutation by declaring it ad hoc to be unproblematic. Instead any
claim that its apparent ﬂaws are not real must be made via sci-
entiﬁc theories and judged as explanations in the same way as
other theories.
In contrast, the traditional (inductivist) account of what hap-
pens when experiments raise a problem is in summary: that from
an apparent unexplained regularity, we are supposed to ‘induce’
that the regularity is universal7 (or, according to ‘Bayesian’
inductivism, to increase our credence for theories predicting that);
while from an apparent irregularity, we are supposed to drop the
theory that had predicted regularity (or to reduce our credence for
it). Such procedures would neither necessitate nor yield any
explanation. But scientiﬁc theories do not take the form of pre-
dictions that past experiments, if repeated, would have the same
outcomes as before: they must, among other things, imply such
predictions, but they consist of explanations.
In any experiment designed to test a scientiﬁc theory T, the
prediction of the result expected under T also depends on other
theories: background knowledge, including explanations of what
the preparation of the experiment achieves, how the apparatus
works, and the sources of error. Nothing about the unmet expec-
tation dictates whether T or any of those background-knowledge
assumptions was at fault. Therefore there is no such thing as an
experimental result logically contradicting8 T, nor logically
entailing a different ‘credence’ for T. But as I have said, an apparent
failure of T's prediction is merely a problem, so seeking an alter-
native to T is merely one possible approach to solving it. And
although there are always countless logically consistent options
for which theory to reject, the number of good explanations known
for an explicandum is always small. Things are going very well
when there are as many as two, with perhaps the opportunity for a
crucial test; more typically it is one or zero.9 For instance, when
neutrinos recently appeared to violate a prediction of general
relativity by exceeding the speed of light, no good explanation
involving new laws of physics was, in the event, created, and the
only good explanation turned out to be that a particular optical
cable had been poorly attached (Adam et al., 2012).
Note that even if T is the culprit, merely replacing it by  T
cannot solve the problem, because the negation of an explanation
(e.g. ‘gravity is not due to the curvature of spacetime’) is not itself
an explanation. Again, at most, ﬁnding a good explanation that
contradicts T can become the aim of a research programme.
I shall now show that it is possible for an explanatory theory T
to be testable even by an experiment for which T makes only
everything-possible-happens predictions, and whose results,
therefore (if T designates them as possible), cannot contradict
those predictions.7 E.g. Aristotle’s deﬁnition of induction as “argument from the particular to the
universal”.
8 That is known as the Duhem–Quine thesis (Quine, 1960). It is true, and must
be distinguished from the Duhem–Quine problem, which is the misconception that
scientiﬁc progress is therefore impossible or problematic.
9 One of the misconceptions underlying the so-called ‘problem of induction’ is
that since there is always an inﬁnity of predictive formulae matching any particular
data, science must be chronically overwhelmed with theories, with too few ways to
choose between them. And hence that scientiﬁc methodology must consist of
rationales for selecting a favoured theory from the overabundance: ‘the simplest’,
perhaps, or the ‘least biased’. But a predictive formula is not an explanation, and
good explanations are hard to come by.3. Refuting theories by their failure to explain
Suppose for simplicity that two mutually inconsistent theories,
D and E, are good explanations of a certain class of explicanda,
including all known results of relevant experiments, with the only
problematic thing about either of them being the other's existence.
Suppose also that in regard to a particular proposed experiment, E
makes only the everything-possible-happens prediction (my dis-
cussion will also hold if it is a something-possible-happens pre-
diction) for results a1; a2;…, while D predicts a particular result a1.
If the experiment is performed and the result a2 is observed, then
D (or more precisely, the combination of D and the background
knowledge) becomes problematic, while neither E nor its combi-
nation with the same background knowledge is problematic any
longer (provided that the explanation via experimental error
would be bad – Section 6 below).
Observing the result a1, on the other hand, would be consistent
with the predictions of both D and E. Even so, it would be a new
explicandum which, by criterion (i) above, would raise a problem
for the explanation E, since why the result a1 was observed but the
others weren't would be explained by D but unexplained by E. Note
that if it were not for the existence of D, the result a1 would not
make E problematic at all. (Nor would any result, and so there
would be no methodological reason for doing the experiment
at all.)
If the experiment is then repeated and the result a1 is obtained
each time, that is an apparent regularity in nature. Again by cri-
terion (i), E then becomes a bad explanation while D becomes the
only known good explanation for all known results of experi-
ments. That is to say, E is refuted (provided, again, that experi-
mental error is a bad explanation). Although E has never made a
false prediction, it cannot account for the new explicandum (i.e.
the repeated results a1) that its rival D explains.
Again, all refutations are tentative. Regardless of how often the
above experiment is repeated with result a1 every time, it remains
possible that E is true – in which case the existence of a different
explanation D with more accurate predictions may be a coin-
cidence. But coincidence by itself could ‘explain’ anything, so,
absent additional explanatory details, it must be a bad explanation
by criterion (iii) above. A good explanation of all relevant obser-
vations might be some E&G, where G is a good explanation for why
the result must be a1 when the experiment is carried out under
these circumstances, and why other results could be obtained
under different circumstances.
Thus it is possible for an explanatory theory to be refuted by
experimental results that are consistent with its predictions. In
particular, the everything-possible-happens interpretation of
quantum theory, to which it has been claimed that Everettian
quantum theory is equivalent, could be refuted in this way (pro-
vided, as always, that a suitable rival theory existed), and hence it
is testable after all. Therefore the argument that Everettian
quantum theory itself is untestable fails at its ﬁrst step. But I shall
show in Section 8 that it is in fact much more testable than any
mere everything-possible-happens theory.
It follows that under E, the string of repeated results a1 is
expected not to happen, in the sense deﬁned in Section 2, even
though E asserts that, like every other sequence, it will happen
(among other things). This is no contradiction. Being expected is a
methodological attribute of a possible result (depending, for
instance, on whether a good explanation for it exists) while hap-
pening is a factual one. What is at issue in this paper is not whe-
ther the properties ‘expected not to happen’ and ‘will happen’ are
consistent but whether they can both follow from the same
deterministic explanatory theory, in this case E, under a reasonable
scientiﬁc methodology. And I have just shown that they can.
D. Deutsch / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 55 (2016) 24–3328Note that the condition that E be explanatory is essential to the
argument of this section, which depends on the criteria (i) and (iii)
for being a bad explanation. Under philosophies of science that
identify theories with their predictions, theories like E would
indeed be untestable and would inform no expectations. So much
the worse for those philosophies.4. The renunciation of authority
The reader may have noticed that the methodology I am
advocating is radically different in purpose, not only in substance,
from that which is taken for granted in most studies of the
“empirical viability” of Everettian quantum theory, and of scien-
tiﬁc theories in general. That traditional role of methodology has
been to provide (1) some form of authority for theories – such as
conﬁrmation of their truth, justiﬁcation, probability, credence,
reason for believing, reason for relying upon, or ‘secure founda-
tions’ and (2) rules for using experiment and observation to give
theories such authority. I am adopting Popper's view (e.g. Popper,
1960) that no such authority exists, nor is needed for anything in
the practice or philosophy of science, and that the quest for it
historically has been a mistake.
Consequently, readers who conceive of science in terms of such
a quest may regard the arguments of this paper as an extended
acknowledgement that Everettian quantum theory is indeed fun-
damentally ﬂawed in its connection to experiment, since in their
view I am denying – for all theories, not just this one – the very
existence of the connection they are seeking. Similarly, many
philosophers regard Popper's own claim to have ‘solved the pro-
blem of induction’ as absurd, since his philosophy neither explains
how inductive reasoning provides such authority nor (given his
claim that no such reasoning exists) provides an alternative
account of scientiﬁc reasoning that does provide it. This is not the
place to defend Popper in this regard (but see Popper (1959)). I
merely ask readers taking such positions to conclude, from this
paper, that the testability of Everettian quantum theory is not an
additional absurdity separate from that of the non-existence of
conﬁrmation, inductive reasoning, etc.
To that end, note that when a methodology has authority as its
purpose, it cannot consistently allow much ambiguity in its rules
or in the concepts (such as ‘conﬁrming instance’, or ‘probability’)
to which they refer, because if two scientists, using different
interpretations of the concepts or rules, draw different conclusions
from the same experimental results, those conclusions cannot
possibly both have authority in the above senses. But the metho-
dology I am advocating is that of requiring theories to be good
explanations and seeking ways of exposing ﬂaws and deﬁciencies
in them. So its rules do not purport to be sources of authority but
merely summarise our “history of learning how not to fool our-
selves” (Feynman, 1974). It is to be expected that people using
those rules may sometimes ‘expect’ different experimental results
or have different opinions about whether something is ‘proble-
matic’. Indeed, explanation itself cannot be deﬁned unambigu-
ously, because, for instance, new modes of explanation can always
be invented (e.g. Darwin's new mode of explanation did not
involve predicting future species from past ones). Disagreeing
about what is problematic or what counts as an explanation will in
general cause scientists to embark on different research projects,
of which one or both may, if they seek it (there are no guarantees),
provide evidence by both their standards that one or both of their
theories are problematic. There is no methodology that can validly
guarantee (or promise with some probability etc.) that following it
will lead to truer theories – as demonstrated by countless argu-
ments of which Quine's (loc. cit.) is one. But if one adopts this
methodology for trying to eliminate ﬂaws and deﬁciencies, thendespite the opportunities for good-faith disagreements that cri-
teria such as (i)–(iii) still allow, one may succeed in doing so.5. The status of stochastic theories
A stochastic theory (in regard to a particular class of experi-
ments) is like a something-possible-happens theory except that it
makes an additional assertion: that a ‘random’ one of the possible
results a1; a2;… happens, with probabilities p1; p2;… speciﬁed by
the theory. The ‘random’ values are either given as initial condi-
tions at the beginning of time (as in pilot-wave versions of
quantum theory) or produced by ‘random processes’ in which a
physical system ‘chooses randomly’ which of several possible
continuations of its trajectory it will follow (as in ‘collapse’ the-
ories). In this section I argue that such a theory cannot be an
explanatory description of nature, and under what circumstances
it can nevertheless be useful as an approximation or mathematical
idealisation.
We have become accustomed to the idea of physical quantities
taking ‘random’ values with each possible value having a ‘prob-
ability’. But the use of that idea in fundamental explanations in
physics is inherently ﬂawed, because statements assigning
probabilities to events, or asserting that the events are random,
form a deductively closed system from which no factual state-
ment (statement about what happens physically) about those
events follows (Papineau, 2002, 2010). For instance, one cannot
identify probabilities with the actual frequencies in repeated
experiments, because they do not equal them in any ﬁnite
number of repeats, and inﬁnitely repeated experiments do not
occur. And in any case, no statement about frequencies in an
inﬁnite set implies anything about a ﬁnite subset – unless it is a
‘typical’ subset, but ‘typical’ is just another probabilistic concept,
not a factual one, so that would be circular. Hence, notwith-
standing that they are called ‘probabilities’, the pi in a stochastic
theory would be purely decorative (and hence the theory would
remain a mere something-possible-happens theory) were it not
for a special methodological rule that is usually assumed impli-
citly. There are many ways of making it explicit, but those that
refer to individual measurement outcomes (rather than to inﬁ-
nite sequences of them, which do not occur in nature) and con-
form to the probability calculus, all agree on this:
If a theory attaches numbers pi to possible results ai of an
experiment; and calls those numbers ‘probabilities’; and if ;
in one or more instances of the experiment; the observed
f requencies of the ai differ significantly; according to some
statistical test; from the pi; then a scientific problem should
be deemed to exist: ð3Þ
(Or on equivalent procedures, under philosophies that do not refer
to ‘problems’.) Every ﬁnite sequence fails some test for random-
ness, and if a statistical test is designed to fail, its failure does not
create a new explicandum, and hence does not make any theory
problematic. Therefore one must choose the statistical test in the
rule (3) independently of the experiment's results (e.g. in advance
of knowing them).
The rule (3) does not specify how many instances, nor which
statistical test, nor at what ‘signiﬁcance level’ the test should be
applied. In the event of a disagreement about those matters, the
experiment can be repeated until the proposed statistical tests all
agree. They will also all agree even for a single experiment if one of
the pi is sufﬁciently close to 1. (Indeed, one can regard repeated
instances of an experiment as a single experiment for which one of
the pi is close to 1.)
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tions about probabilities are ‘tested’.10 I shall henceforward place
the term in quotation marks when referring to such predictions
because such ‘tests’ are not tests under the methodology of science
I am advocating. They depend unavoidably on following rule (3),
and the crucial thing about that rule is that it is methodological,
and therefore normative: it is about how experimenters should
behave and think in response to certain events; it is not a sup-
posed law of nature, nor is it any factual claim about what happens
in nature (the explicanda), nor is it derived from one. So it should
not, by criterion (i), appear in a (good) scientiﬁc explanation. Nor,
on the other hand, could it be appended to the explanatory sci-
entiﬁc methodology I am advocating, for then it would be purely
ad hoc: scientiﬁc methodology should be about whether reality
seems to conform to our explanations; there is a problem when it
does not, and only then. And one cannot make an explanation
problematic merely by declaring it so. Nor, therefore, can one make
a theory testable merely by promising to deem certain experi-
mental results, consistent with the theory, problematic. If such
results are unexplained by a theory (as in the example in
Section 3), then the theory is already problematic and there is no
need for a special rule such as (3). But if not, the theory is not
problematic, and no ad hoc methodological rule can make it so.
Yet rule (3) is tacitly assumed by the Born rule (2), and con-
sequently by ‘collapse’ theories, and by pilot-wave theories, which,
like all stochastic theories, depend both for their physical meaning
and for their ‘testability’ on (3). As I said, their ‘probabilities’ are
merely decorative without it.
So, how is it that stochastic theories can be useful in practice? I
shall show in Section 7 how ‘collapse’ variants of quantum theory
can, even though they are ruled out as descriptions of nature by
the above argument. But most useful stochastic theories take the
form of unphysically idealised models whose logic is as follows.
The explicandum is some process whose real deﬁning property is
awkward or intractable to express precisely (such as the fairness of
a pair of dice and of how they are thrown, or the non-
designedness of mutations in genes). One replaces that property
by the mathematical property of randomness. This method of
approximation can be useful only if there is a good explanation for
why one can expect the intended purpose of the model to be
unaffected by that replacement. In the case of dice, the intended
purpose of fairness includes things like the outcomes being
unpredictable by the players. One would argue, among other
things, that this purpose is achieved because the manner in which
they are thrown does not give the thrower an opportunity to
determine the outcome, because that would require motor control
far beyond the precision of which human muscles and nerves are
capable; and therefore that any pattern in the results that was
meaningful in the game would be an unexplained regularity. Then
one would argue that the optimal strategy for playing a game
involving dice thrown in a realistic way is identical to what it
would be in a game where the dice were replaced by a generator of
random numbers – even though the latter is physically impossible.
Then one can develop useful strategies without needing to cal-
culate speciﬁcally what human hands and real dice would do,
which would require intractable computations of microscopic
processes even if one knew the precise initial conditions, of which
one is necessarily ignorant.
But one thing that cannot be modelled by random numbers is
ignorance itself (as in the ‘ignorance interpretation of probability’).
Fortunately, our ignorance of the microstate of the gas molecules10 A stochastic theory may also make non-probabilistic predictions and be
tested through them. In particular, every stochastic theory makes something-
possible-happens assertions, and these may allow it to be tested in the manner of
Section 3. I shall give an example of this in Section 8.in a ﬂame has no bearing on why it warms us. The prediction (via
the kinetic theory of gases, etc.) that it will radiate heat under
particular circumstances rests not on ignorance but on a sub-
stantive, independently testable explanation of why it would make
very little difference to regard the state of the ﬂame as random
with a particular probability distribution. That explanation is,
again, that under the given circumstances any state of the ﬂame
that would not do so would have properties that would constitute
an unexplained regularity and hence a new explicandum and a
problem. So it is because we know something about the ﬂame –
not because of any of the things we do not know – that we expect
it to warm us. Expectations, as always in science, are derived from
explanatory theories.
The prevalence of the misconceptions about probability that I
have described in this section has accustomed us to reinterpreting
all human thought in probabilistic terms, as advocated by ‘Baye-
sian’ philosophy, but this is a mistake. When a jury disagrees on
what is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ or ‘true on the balance of
probabilities’, it is not because jurors have disagreed on the
numerical value of some quantities obeying the probability cal-
culus. What they have actually done (or should have done,
according to the methodology I advocate here), is try to explain
the evidence. Thus ‘guilty beyond reasonable doubt’ should mean
that they consider all explanations that they can think of, that clear
the defendant, bad by criteria such as (i)–(iii). And if they interpret
those criteria differently, it should not be because they are with
hindsight exploiting the leeway in them in order to deliver a
particular verdict – because that would itself violate criterion (iii).
Although the consequences of error may (or may not) be very
different in the laboratory and the courtroom, what we should do
– and all we can do, as I explained in Section 4 – is adopt meth-
odologies, in science as in law and everything else, whose purpose
is to facilitate error correction, not to create (a semblance of)
authority for our surviving guesses.6. Experimental error
Since error can never be perfectly eliminated from experi-
ments, their results are meaningless unless accompanied by an
estimate of the errors in them. Error estimates are often treated as
probabilistic – either literally, in the sense of the results being
treated as stochastic variables, or as credences. But since the
approach I am advocating eschews both literal probabilities and
credences, I must now give a non-probabilistic account of the
nature of errors and error estimates.
Any proposed scientiﬁc experiment must come with an
explanatory theory of how the apparatus, when used in practice,
would work. This is used to estimate what I shall call the least
expected error and the greatest expected error, which I shall deﬁne
in a way that does not refer to probability.
For example, suppose that we use everyday equipment to
measure out pieces of dough in a kitchen, intending them to have
equal weights, and that later we ﬁnd that they do indeed all have
equal weights according to a state-of-the-art laboratory balance.
The theories of that and of the kitchen apparatus will provide an
explanation for why the latter is much less accurate (say, because
of friction and play in its moving parts), so those results are
unexpected under the deﬁnition of ‘expect’ in Section 2, and
constitute an unexplained regularity (as with the dice in
Section 4). They are therefore a new explicandum, and proble-
matic by criterion (i). ‘Coincidence’ would be one explanation
consistent with these events, but under the circumstances that
would be a bad explanation by criterion (iii). The least error which,
if subsequently discovered, would not make the theory of the
apparatus problematic, I call the least expected error.
11 Pilot-wave theories and ‘dynamical collapse’ theories implement the Born
rule indirectly, but are also stochastic theories in the sense I have deﬁned. Though
they do not give measurements a special status, the conclusions of this section
apply to them too, because they depend on Rule (3) for their ‘testing’.
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weigh more than the others combined, and if, according to our
explanation of how the measuring-out process worked, such a
piece would have been noticed during it and subdivided, that
would be an unexplained irregularity and therefore a problem by
criteria (i) and (ii). The greatest such error which, if subsequently
discovered, would not make the theory of the apparatus proble-
matic, I call the greatest expected error.
Understood in this way, the greatest and least expected errors
are properties of the state of explanatory theories about the
apparatus and its use. Improving those theories could increase or
reduce the expected errors even if the apparatus and its use are
unchanged.
Experimental errors are often categorised as ‘random’ or ‘sys-
tematic’, but those terms can be misleading: Random errors are
those caused by processes such as Brownian motion, which are
well approximated by a known stochastic law. So they can be
understood in the manner of Section 4. And in theory testing,
where experiments are necessarily repeatable, such processes do
not necessarily cause errors, because their effect could be made
negligible just by repeating the experiment sufﬁciently often. So
what remains to be explained here are systematic errors – that is,
errors that are not random but unknown, and therefore conform to
no known system. (This includes errors that could be approxi-
mated as random with suitable stochastic laws, perhaps depend-
ing on time and other conditions, if those were known.) Like the
‘unknown unknowns’ of military planning (Rumsfeld, 2002),
unknown variables in physics are counter-intuitive. Theories of
them are something-possible-happens theories, which I have
discussed, but what does it mean to estimate errors that are
unknown, yet not random?
For example, consider measuring a real-valued physical quan-
tity χ that all relevant explanations agree is a constant of nature –
say, the speed of light in units of a standard rod and clock. For any
given design of measuring instrument (say, that of Fizeau), even
with repeated runs of the experiment whose results are optimally
combined to give an overall result x, the greatest expected value of
xχ
  cannot be reduced beyond a certain limit, say ε, because of
systematic errors. (I shall for simplicity consider only cases where
the expectations of positive and negative errors are sufﬁciently
similar for xχ
  to be an appropriate quantity to estimate.)
As always with something-possible-happens theories, there
will be a set of possible values, determined by various explana-
tions. I have already mentioned the theories that χ is constant
under suitable circumstances, and is a real number (not a vector,
say). There will also be upper and lower bounds a and b on x,
determined by explanations of the apparatus and of χ itself. For
example, there was a limit on the speed at which Fizeau's cogged
wheel could be smoothly rotated. And before the speed of light
was ever measured, there was already a good explanation that it
must be greater than that of sound because lightning arrives
before thunder. Furthermore, even though χ has a continuous
range of possible values, x must be instantiated in a discrete
variable, because even in cases where the result appears in a
nominally continuous variable, like a pointer angle, it must
always end up in a discrete form such as numerals recorded on
paper, or in brains, before it can participate in the processes of
scientiﬁc methodology. So x has only ﬁnitely many possible
values between a and b. For simplicity, suppose that they have a
constant spacing δ.
So it would not make sense to estimate xχ
  at less than δ=2,
nor of course at more than ba. But what does it mean to estimate
it at some ε with δ{ε{ba? The estimate ε cannot be regarded
as probabilistic (e.g. as ‘ xχ
  is probably no more than ε’), since
that would allow further measurements with the same instrument
to improve the accuracy of the result, and we are dealing with thecase where they cannot. Nor, for similar reasons, can it be regarded
as a bound on xχ
 , since then, if x1 and x2 were two different
results, we should have x1χ
 oε and x2χ
 oε and hence
1
2 x1þx2ð Þχ
 oε12 x1x2j j, which would contradict the
assumption that ε is the best estimate of the error. (Unless x1 ¼ x2,
but if all results were equal despite εcδ, this would be an
unexplained regularity and a new problem, as in the previous
example.) So the estimate can only mean, again as in that example,
that if the true error xχ
  were later revealed to exceed ε (by a
measurement that was more accurate according to an unrivalled
good explanation), that would make our explanation of the mea-
surement process problematic. And that explanation, being about
unknown errors, cannot be of any help in increasing our knowl-
edge of χ: knowledge cannot be obtained from ignorance.
Some error processes have inherently bounded effects, but
most explanations that inform error estimates are, like the ones in
the dough example, not about the error processes themselves, but
about processes in the experiment that are expected to prevent or
correct or detect errors, but only if they are above a certain size.
Hence, if we estimate xχ
  at ε, and then perform the whole
measurement several times with results x1; x2;…, and max
xixj
   turns out to be less than ε, that tells us nothing more
about χ than we knew when we had performed it once. In parti-
cular, it need not (absent other knowledge) tell us that χ is ‘likely’
to be, or can be expected to be, between the largest and the
smallest of the xi. Indeed, as I said, if max xixj
   is too small
(smaller than the least expected error), then the whole experiment
is (absent further explanation) problematic, just as it is when some
xixj
  is greater than ε.
So both the inevitable presence in the multiverse of all possible
errors after any experiment, and the validity of approximating
some but not all of them as probabilistic, are consistent with the
conception of science that I am advocating.7. ‘Collapse’ variants of quantum theory
‘Collapse’ variants of quantum theory invoke a special law of
motion, namely the Born rule (2), for times t when a measurement
is completed. This law is unique in being the only stochastic law of
motion ever proposed in fundamental physics.11 Though vague, it
does have a “domain of validity” that includes all experiments that
are currently feasible. Within that domain, it allows those theories
to be ‘tested’ as stochastic theories, according to the rationale
described in Section 4, and all such ‘tests’ to date have been pas-
sed. Speciﬁcally, the logic of such a ‘test’ is as follows:
According to a law of motion L under a ‘collapse’ theory with
the Born rule, the probabilities of the possible results a1; a2;… of
the given measurement are p1; p2;… respectively. A different law
of motion (or a different version of quantum theory, or some other
stochastic theory), predicts different probabilities q1; q2;…. The
two sets of probabilities follow from the only known good
explanations of the phenomena in question. A statistical test is
chosen, together with some signiﬁcance level α and a number N,
where N is sufﬁcient for the following. The experiment is per-
formed N times. Let n1;n2;… be the number of times that the
result was a1; a2;… respectively. The statistical test distinguishes
between three possibilities: (i) the probability is less than α that
the observed frequencies n1=N; n2=N;… would differ by at least
this much from the p1; p2;… and at least this little from the q1; q2
;… if the probabilities really were p1; p2;…; or (ii) the same with
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to make it impossible for neither (i) nor (ii) to hold.12 If (iii) holds,
the experiment is inconclusive. But if (i) holds, Rule (3) requires
the experimenter behave as if the ﬁrst theory had been (tenta-
tively) refuted; or if (ii) holds, the same for the second theory. As I
argued in Section 4, Rule (3) cannot make an explanation pro-
blematic; so there has to be an explanatory reason, not just a rule,
for regarding the respective theories as problematic if that hap-
pens – see the following section.
For convenience in what follows, I shall re-state the statistical-
test part of the above ‘testing’ procedure in terms of gambling: The
experimenter considers a class of thought experiments in which
two gamblers, one of whom knows only the ﬁrst theory and the
other only the second, bet with each other, at mutually agreed
odds, on what each result a1; a2;…, or combination of those
results, will be. They behave rationally in the sense of classical
(probabilistic) game theory, i.e. they try to maximise the expecta-
tion values of their winnings, as determined by the Born rule (2)
and their respective theories. Since the p1; p2;… are not all equal
to the corresponding q1; q2;…, the experimenter can set odds for a
pattern of bets on various propositions (such as ‘the next outcome
will be between a2 and a7’), to which each gambler would agree
because each would calculate that the probabilistic expectation
value of his winnings is positive for each bet. Each such pattern
corresponds to a statistical test of whether the results are ‘sig-
niﬁcantly’ incompatible with the ﬁrst theory, the second, or both.
Finally, given the actual results of the experiments, the experi-
menter calculates the amount that the winner would have won
(which is the amount that the loser would have lost). If it exceeds a
certain value, rule (3) then requires the loser's theory to be
deemed ‘refuted’ at the appropriate signiﬁcance level. If neither
wins more than that value, then the experiment is inconclusive.
Note, in passing, that these ‘tests’ of what their advocates call
‘probabilistic predictions’ are not the only ones by which theories
framed under ‘collapse’ theories can be tested. They, like most
versions of quantum theory, also make ordinary (i.e. non-prob-
abilistic) predictions of, for instance, emission spectra, and the
location of dark bands in interference patterns. It is true that in
experimental practice there are small deviations from those pre-
dictions, for example due to differences between the real system
and apparatus and idealised models of them assumed by the
prediction, but in the absence of a rival explanatory theory pre-
dicting those deviations, they are validly treated as experimental
errors, as in Section 6.
Note also that the Born rule's identiﬁcation of the quantities13
xih jψ tð Þ
 j2 as probabilities cannot hold at general times t for any
observable with eigenstates xij i for which interference is detect-
able, directly or indirectly. That is because during interference
phenomena, i.e. almost all the time in almost all quantum systems,
those quantities violate the axioms of the probability calculus
(Deutsch, Ekert, & Lupacchini, 2000).14 For a comprehensive defence of that version of game-theoretic rationality,
and rebuttals of counter-arguments, see Wallace (2012) Part II.
15 A proof is not necessarily an explanation, so ‘proved’ in this context is a
lesser claim than ‘fully explained’. Quantum theory is currently in a similar8. Everettian quantum theory
Everettian quantum theory's combination of determinism with
unpredictable outcomes of experiments has motivated two main
criticisms of it in relation to probability. The one that I presented in12 Conﬁrmation-based methodologies would interpret (i) as ‘second theory
conﬁrmed, ﬁrst refuted’ (to signiﬁcance level α), and (ii) as vice-versa, and (iii) as
‘neither theory conﬁrmed, both refuted’, and N and α are chosen so as to make it
impossible for both to be ‘conﬁrmed’.
13 These are discrete quantities. For continuous eigenvalues x, the Born rule
says that xh jψ tð Þ
 j2, usually represented as ψ x; tð Þ 2, is a probability distribution
function over x, at certain times t.Section 1, which denies the theory's testability (or misleadingly, its
conﬁrmability), is called the ‘epistemic problem’. The other – the
‘practical problem’ – denies that decisions whose options have
multiple simultaneous outcomes can be made rationally if all the
possible outcomes of any option are going to happen anyway. The
latter criticism has been rebutted by the so-called decision-
theoretic argument (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003). Using a non-
probabilistic version of game-theoretic rationality,14 it proves15
that (in the terminology of the present paper) rational gamblers
who knew Everettian quantum theory (and considered it a good
explanation) but knew no ‘collapse’ variants of it (or considered
them bad explanations), and have therefore made no probabilistic
assumptions, when playing games in which randomisers were
replaced by quantum measurements, would place their bets as if
those were randomisers, i.e. using the probabilistic rule (2)
according to the methodological rule (3).
The decision-theoretic argument, since it depends on game-
theoretic axioms, which are normative, is itself a methodological
theory, not a scientiﬁc one. And therefore, according to it, all valid
uses of probability in decision-making are methodological too.
They apply when, and only when, some emergent physical phe-
nomena are well approximated as ‘measurements’, ‘decisions’ etc.
so that the axioms of non-probabilistic game theory are applicable.
Applying them is a substantive step that does not (and could not)
follow from scientiﬁc theories.
Solving the ‘practical problem’ does not fully solve the ‘epis-
temic problem’, for one cannot directly translate the gamblers’
situation into the scientist's. For instance, it is not clear how the
scientist's equivalent of ‘winnings’ on discovering a true theory
should be modelled, since there is no subjective difference
between discovering a true theory and mistakenly thinking that
one has. On the view, which I have argued here is a misconception,
that scientiﬁc methodology is about generating conﬁrmation of, or
credence for, theories being true or probable, the ‘epistemic’ pro-
blem takes the form: ‘the decision-theoretic argument proves that
if one believes Everettian quantum theory, it is rational (in that
non-probabilistic game-theoretic sense) to make choices as
though the outcomes were probabilistic; but it cannot be rational
in any sense to believe Everettian quantum theory in the ﬁrst place
because, by hypothesis, we would then believe that whenever
some experimental evidence has led us to believe Everettian
quantum theory, the contrary evidence was in reality present too’.
There are arguments (e.g. Greaves, 2007) that the ‘epistemic’
conclusion nevertheless follows from versions of the decision-
theoretic argument, but unfortunately they share the same mis-
conception about conﬁrmation and credence, so for present pur-
poses it would be invalid to appeal to them. Hence I must connect
the decision-theoretic argument to theory testing via a route that
does not assign conﬁrmation, credence, or probability to theories.
The connection is, fortunately, straightforward: it is via expec-
tations, which, in the non-probabilistic sense deﬁned in Section 2,
are not credences and do not obey the probability calculus. Nor, as
I showed there, is it per se inconsistent to expect an experiment toexplanatory state to that of general theory of relativity in its early years: it
explained the phenomena of gravity decisively better than any rival theory, and
from its principles many things could be proved about the orbits of planets, the
behaviour of clocks, etc., including testable predictions; nevertheless the entity that
it directly referred to, namely spacetime, was only imperfectly explained, so that,
for instance, the event horizon in the Schwarzschild solution was mistaken for a
physical singularity. Analogously, the entity that quantum theory directly refers to,
namely the multiverse, is only imperfectly explained at present, in terms of
approximative entities such as universes (Deutsch, 2010).
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happen – provided that there is an explanation for such expecta-
tions, which, indeed, there is, as follows.
Suppose that gamblers who knew Everettian quantum theory
and did not use any probabilistic rule such as (2) or (3), and were
rational in the non-probabilistic sense required by the decision-
theoretic argument, were to play the quantum-measurement-
driven game of Section 7. That argument says that they would
place exactly the same bets as described there. If one of themwere
to lose by a large enough margin, his expectation (in the non-
probabilistic sense deﬁned in Section 2) will have been violated,
while the other's will not. Hence the loser's theory will be pro-
blematic and the winner's not. The experimenter who seeks good
explanations can infer that if the gamblers were then informed of
each other's theory, they would both consider that the loser's
theory has been refuted, and hence the experimenter – who is
now aware of the same evidence and theories as they are – must
agree with them.
Following this testing procedure will (tentatively) refute dif-
ferent theories in different universes. As I said in Section 4, this is
no defect in a methodology that does not purport to be guaran-
teed, nor probabilistically likely, to select true theories. However,
note, as a reassuring consistency check (not a derivation – that
would be circular!), that the decision-theoretic argument also
implies that on the assumption that one of the theories is true, it is
rational (by the criteria used in the argument) to bet that the other
one will be refuted.
Consequently, the conventional modes of testing ‘collapse’
variants of quantum theory, or theories formulated under them,
are valid for Everettian quantum theory: any experiment that
‘tests’ a probabilistic prediction of a ‘collapse’ variant is auto-
matically also a valid test of the corresponding multi-universe
prediction of Everettian quantum theory, because it does not
depend on the Born rule nor any other assumption referring to
probability.
Indeed, as I have argued in Sections 4 and 5, on this view of the
logic of testability it is stochastic theories, including ‘collapse’
variants of quantum theory, that suffer from the very ﬂaw that
Everettian quantum theory is accused of having under conven-
tional theories of probability, namely: conventional ‘tests’ of (or
under) those variants all depend on arbitrary instructions such as
the rule (3) about what experimenters should think. If it were
deemed valid to add such instructions to a scientiﬁc theory's
assertions about reality, the same could be done to Everettian
quantum theory and the entire controversy about its testability
would collapse by ﬁat. But it does not need special methodological
rules. It is testable through its physical assertions alone.
So all scientiﬁc theories can (as they must) all be tested under
the same methodological rules. There is no need, and no room, for
special pleading on behalf of ‘collapse’ theories. Nor is there any
room for stochastic theories, except those that can be explained as
approximations in the sense of Section 4. Indeed, Albrecht and
Phillips (2014) suggest that all stochastic phenomena currently
known to physics are quantum phenomena in disguise.
Traditional ‘collapse’ theories are also inherently far worse
explanations than Everettian quantum theory, by criterion (i),
since they neither explain what happens physically between
measurements, nor what happens during a ‘collapse’. They also
suffer from a class of inconsistencies known as the ‘measurement
problem’ (thus failing criterion (ii)), which do not exist in Ever-
ettian quantum theory.
Note, however, that Everettian quantum theory is in principle
testable against ‘dynamical collapse’ stochastic theories such as
the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theory with ﬁxed parameters, or any
‘collapse’ variants that specify explicitly enough the conditions
under which ‘collapse’ is supposed to happen. That is because inprinciple one can then construct interference experiments that
would produce a deterministic result a1 under Everettian quantum
theory but a range of possibilities a1; a2;… under those theories
(Deutsch, 1985). Those are something-possible-happens asser-
tions, so even though the theories also assign ‘probabilities’ to
those values, the something-possible-happens assertions alone, if
borne out (with any result other than a1), would be sufﬁcient to
refute Everettian quantum theory. If, in addition, repeated results
had statistics close to those of the probabilistic assertions, there
would be a new problem of explaining that: a literally stochastic
theory is not explanatory, as explained in Section 5. If, on the other
hand, repeated results a1 were obtained, that would refute the
non-Everettian theories, as explained in Section 3 – but they can
also be ruled out without experimentation, as bad explanations.9. Generalisation to constructor theory
Marletto (2015) has shown that if the decision-theoretic argu-
ment is valid, it also applies to a wide class of theories that con-
form to constructor theory (Deutsch & Marletto, 2015). The argu-
ments of this paper would apply to any theory in that class: they
are all testable. (Everettian quantum theory is of course in the
class; versions of quantum theory that invoke random physical
quantities are not.)10. Conclusions
By adopting a conception – based on Popper's – of scientiﬁc
theories as conjectural and explanatory and rooted in problems
(rather than being positivistic, instrumentalist and rooted in evi-
dence), and a scientiﬁc methodology not involving induction,
conﬁrmation, probability or degrees of credence, and bearing in
mind the decision-theoretic argument for betting-type decisions,
we can eliminate the perceived problems about testing Everettian
quantum theory and arrive at several simpliﬁcations of metho-
dological issues in general.
‘Bayesian’ credences are eliminated from the methodology of
science, but rational expectations are given an objective meaning
independent of subjective beliefs.
The claim that standard methods of testing are invalid for
Everettian quantum theory depends on adopting a positivist or
instrumentalist view of what the theory is about. That claim
evaporates, given that scientiﬁc theories are about explaining the
physical world.
Even everything-possible-happens theories can be testable. But
Everettian quantum theory is not one of them. Because of its
explanatory structure (exploited by, for instance, the decision-
theoretic argument) it is testable in all the standard ways. It is the
predictions of its ‘collapse’ variants (and any theory predicting
literally stochastic processes in nature) that are not genuinely
testable: their ‘tests’ depend on scientists conforming to a rule of
behaviour, and not solely on explanations conforming to reality.Acknowledgements
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